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Bay
INTRODUCTION
One of President Obama's most public failures was his inability to close the
prison at Guantinamo Bay. He had campaigned against the facility throughout
the 2008 election, and on his second day in office signed an executive order or-
dering the base closed within a year.2 But eight years later the prison remained
defiantly open.
A major reason for this failure was congressional opposition.' While this op-
position took different forms, one critical tool has received little attention: the
certification requirements that governed the transfers of detainees from GuantA-
namo to foreign countries. Beginning in late 2010, Congress demanded that,
prior to a detainee transfer, the Secretary of Defense certify that the receiving
country had taken the steps "necessary to ensure that the individual cannot en-
gage or re-engage in any terrorist activity."' While the precise language of this
certification changed over time, its effect was the same: Congress's requirements
1. See, e.g., Elizabeth White, Obama Says Gitmo Facility Should Close, WASH. POST (June 24,
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/o6/24/AR200 7 o624
01046.html [http://perma.cc/6X5X-SU29].
2. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 27, 2009).
3. See, e.g., Jeremy Herb, Obama Slams Congress for Blocking Efforts To Close Gitmo, POLITICO
(Jan. 19, 2017), http://WWW.politico.com/story/2017/01/obama-congress-guantanamo-bay
-233859 [http://perma.cc/6MSS-4XLT] (describing President Obama criticizing Congress
"for playing politics in repeatedly blocking his effort to close the terrorist prison"); see also
infra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
4. Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, 5
1033(b)(5), 124 Stat. 4137, 4352 (2011).
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made the Secretary of Defense "personally responsible for preventing recidi-
vism,"' accountable for any mistakes.
Certification requirements have long been thought of as a weak check on the
Executive. "When push comes to shove, a certification requirement will not pre-
vent the executive branch from acting, if it believes that there are compelling
reasons to do so," wrote one commentator.6 Yet at Guantinamo these require-
ments proved "devastating."' "As Secretary, that provision required that I sign
my life away," said former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta.'
The success of certification requirements in stymieing Guantinamo's closure
makes clear that it is time to rethink the narrative of their inefficacy. This Com-
ment argues that certifications have been underestimated because they have been
undertheorized. Certifications require an individual to attest that a state of affairs
exists before a particular action can be taken.' Fundamentally, then, certifications
should be understood as tools to localize accountability for a judgment. In the
context of high stakes or uncertain decisions, this localization of responsibility
concentrates the risk of blame: a decision may jeopardize the certifier's job secu-
rity, personal welfare, and public image. While such concerns may not be the
only guiding considerations of public officials, they are surely among them.o By
heightening the risk of blame, certifications can change an individual's decision-
making calculus, thereby becoming a stronger influence on executive action than
the scholarly consensus acknowledges.
Part I surveys the existing literature on certifications before contrasting the
literature's conclusions with the important role certifications played at GuantA-
namo Bay. The discrepancy shows that a new account is needed. Part II provides
that new account, showing when certifications can be effective - that is, when
5. Connie Bruck, Why Obama Has Failed To Close Guantinamo, NEW YORKER (Aug. 1, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2o16/o8/ol/why-obama-has-failed-to-close
-guantanamo [http://perma.cc/X4TZ-BTB9].
6. Mark A. Chinen, Presidential Certifications in U.S. Foreign Policy Legislation, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & PoL. 217, 272 (1999).
7. Bruck, supra note 5.
8. Id.
9. Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Carter, 62 TEX. L. REv. 785, 827 (1984); cf Cer-
tification, BLACK'S LAwDICTIONARY (loth ed. 2014) (defining a certification as "an official doc-
ument stating that a specified standard has been satisfied"); Chinen, supra note 6, at 219 (de-
fining certification requirements as "laws that require the President to certify as to particular
conditions before acting").
1o. See CHRISTOPHER HOOD, THE BLAME GAMvE: SPIN, BUREAUCRACY, AND SELF-PRESERVATION IN
GOVERNMENT 7-8 (2010) (describing the motivations of public officials to avoid blame); see
also Graham T. Allison, Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 63 AM. POL. Scl. REv.
689, 710 (1969) (noting the role of "personal interests" in political decision-making).
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they can influence the Executive to behave in ways it would have otherwise re-
sisted. Part III leverages Part II's theoretical account to explore the 2015 American
SAFE Act, a bill that would have imposed crippling certification requirements
on the Iraqi and Syrian refugee programs. The American SAFE Act illustrates
that the substantive and political power of certifications extends beyond Guan-
tAnamo Bay, while also revealing that legislators themselves have varying
sophistication in their understanding of this power. The Comment concludes
that, contrary to the prevailing scholarly view, certifications instituted under the
right conditions can meaningfully shape executive policy making.
I. CERTIFICATIONS' UNDERAPPRECIATION
A. The Existing Scholarship
Congressional requirements that an executive officer personally attest to a
policy decision are not new; they appeared early in both foreign and domestic
policy." However, certifications became much more common in foreign affairs
beginning in the 1970s as Congress began to reassert itself against the Presi-
dent.12 According to one 1999 tally, certification requirements appeared in "more
than one hundred provisions relating to U.S. foreign policy,""' including in leg-
islation concerning specific nation-states and multilateral organizations, as well
as on particular foreign policy issues.14 For instance, a number of certification
requirements in the late 1970s and early 198os conditioned foreign aid upon the
Executive affirming that the receiving country had made human rights pro-
gress." Such requirements are intended both to control the executive branch in
foreign affairs and to influence the behavior of the foreign states themselves. 16
ii. Chinen, supra note 6, at 221. For examples of early certifications, see id. at 221 n.16.
12. Id. at 222.
13. Id. at 223. For a more recent high-profile example, see the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-17, 129 Stat. 201.
14. Chinen, supra note 6, at 286-306.
15. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 26(a), 88 Stat. 1795,1802 (tying
twenty million dollars in military assistance for South Korea to the President's finding that
South Korea is making "significant progress" in observing human rights); International Se-
curity Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113, § 725, 95 Stat. 1519, 1553
(conditioning assistance upon the President certifying, inter alia, that the Argentinian govern-
ment had made "significant progress" in complying with human rights principles); id. § 726,
95 Stat. 1519, 1554 (requiring the same for Chile).
16. Chinen, supra note 6, at 220.
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Some of the United States's most important national security laws have cer-
tification requirements. For instance, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act, the provision that authorizes the warrantless surveillance of non-
U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States," requires a
special court to approve annual certifications by the Attorney General and the
Director of National Intelligence. These certifications, among other things, re-
quire the officials to attest that a "significant purpose" of the surveillance is to
obtain foreign intelligence information and that the surveillance complies with
certain statutory restrictions." The War Powers Resolution, too, employs a cer-
tification requirement: the President may trigger a thirty-day extension to the
Act's sixty-day use-of-force window by certifying to Congress "that unavoidable
military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires
the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt
removal of such forces." 9
Despite their historical provenance and contemporary popularity, certifica-
tion requirements have been met with little scholarly discussion. While scholars
have periodically examined executive certifications in the context of particular
programs,20 the literature on certifications themselves is limited. What exists has
been particularly influenced by human rights certifications made during the
Carter and Reagan Administrations; these certifications, required to continue
foreign aid to specific countries, were controversial.2 1 Perhaps as a result, the
literature is largely dismissive of the possibility that certifications can meaning-
fully shape executive behavior.
17. FISA: 702 Collection, LAWFARE, http://www.lawfareblog.com/topic/fisa-702-collection
[http://perma.cc/HM69-VU4Y] (Jan. 18, 2018, 4:29 PM).
18. 5o U.S.C. § 1881la (2012); see also Section 702: What It Is & How It Works, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY
& TECH. (Feb. 15, 2017), http://cdt.org/insight/section-702-what-it-is-how-it-works
[http://perma.cc/Y74Y-LKIE2].
19. So U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2012).
20. See, e.g., H. Richard Friman, Behind the Curtain: Naming and Shaming in International Drug
Control, in THE POLITICS OF LEVERAGE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: NAME, SHAME, AND
SANCTION 143, 153-62 (H. Richard Friman ed., 2015) (discussing U.S. certifications related to
international narcotics control).
21. See, e.g., John Norton Moore, The Secret War in CentralAmerica and the Future of World Order,
So AM. J. INT'LL. 43, 69 (1986) (discussing the Carter Administration's certification that Nic-
aragua was not giving assistance to international terrorism - a certification that was contro-
versial based on the evidence but necessary to continue providing economic aid); Scott Hor-
ton & Randy Sellier, Commentary, The Utility of Presidential Certifications of Compliance with
United States Human Rights Policy: The Case of El Salvador, 1982 WIs. L. REv. 825; Amy S.
Griffin, Comment, Constitutional Impediments to Enforcing Human Rights Legislation: The Case
ofEl Salvador, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 163, 210 (1983).
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Mark Chinen's Presidential Certifications in U.S. Foreign Policy Legislation pro-
vides the most comprehensive theoretical treatment to date. Chinen argues that
certification requirements attempt to control executive action in foreign affairs
by "requiring the executive branch to take into account the concerns they [the
certification requirements] represent -they ensure that the President has cov-
ered all the bases before making a foreign policy decision."22 But, Chinen con-
cludes, certification requirements "are ultimately ineffective in controlling exec-
utive behavior."23 Chinen cites a number of factors that limit certifications'
capacity to shape executive behavior, including Congress's limited ability to con-
test a certification when it disagrees with the Executive's assessment: to overturn
a certification directly, Congress would need to pass a joint resolution, likely over
a presidential veto. Courts are unlikely to provide relief because they will be re-
luctant to arbitrate interbranch disputes over whether the Executive's character-
izations are accurate.24 As an example of this judicial reluctance, Chinen points
to Crockett v. Reagan,25 where twenty-nine members of Congress sued President
Reagan and other officials for providing military assistance to El Salvador's anti-
communist government.2 6 This military assistance had been conditioned upon
the President making certifications as to El Salvador's human rights progress.2 7
President Reagan made these certifications, but their accuracy was dubious -
members of Congress characterized them as "akin to calling night day or a duck
an eagle."28 The congressional plaintiffs submitted "voluminous" documentation
of human rights abuses and asked the court to independently examine the accu-
racy of the President's certifications. The court declined to do so, saying that
"[w] hatever infirmities the President's certifications may or may not suffer," the
plaintiffs' dispute was with their fellow legislators who have accepted the certi-
fications.29 Because certification requirements lack strong legislative or judicial
enforcement mechanisms, Chinen argues that "the President need only give col-
orable arguments to justify a particular certification."o Peter Quint makes a sim-
ilar point, citing the El Salvador certifications to show that while certification
22. Chinen, supra note 6, at 234.
23. Id. at 272.
24. See id. at 243-44.
25. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
26. For his discussion of Crockett, see Chinen, supra note 6, at 253-55.
27. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113,
§ 728(d), 95 Stat. 1519, 1556.
28. Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 902.
29. Id.
30. Chinen, supra note 6, at 272.
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"appears to be a mandatory device, it is actually hortatory in nature because the
Executive's certification is ordinarily not subjected to effective review."
Other scholars also rely on the El Salvador certifications in arguing that the
objective fact-finding demanded by a certification will yield to the Executive's
policy preferences. Scott Horton and Randy Sellier assert that though the Salva-
doran government was not actually making the progress required by the certifi-
cation requirements (and indeed was complicit in human rights abuses), Presi-
dent Reagan was committed to supporting the anti-communist government and
so made the certifications anyway. 32 They conclude that the certifications were
little more than parchment barriers: "[RIegardless of the factual situation in El
Salvador, it is difficult to imagine the President abandoning his policy because
of a congressionally created certification process. He will simply go through the
formality of filing the required papers. .. ."" Amy S. Griffin also casts a critical
eye on certification requirements based on the El Salvadoran experience, con-
cluding that while the certifications were meant to be "purely factual determina-
tions," in reality they would be shaped by the President's policy preferences. She
suggests that if Congress were truly serious about cutting off aid to human rights
abusers, it would remove "the factual determination from the broad realm of
presidential discretion" by appointing an independent human rights commis-
sion charged with making the requisite factual determinations.34 Jeffrey A.
Meyer similarly proposes pairing defined, objective certification criteria with a
"shadow" fact-finding commission; the combination, he argues, would con-
strain attempts by the Executive to play fast-and-loose with certifications."
The consensus, then, is that certification requirements are weak tools for
controlling executive behavior.36 A 2014 Note in the Harvard Law Review sums
up the conventional wisdom: "Scholars have shown that executive certification
31. Quint, supra note 9, at 827, 827 n.221.
32. Horton & Sellier, supra note 21, at 842-58.
33. Id. at 859.
34. Griffin, supra note 21, at 210.
35. Jeffrey A. Meyer, Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 69, 101 (1988).
36. In addition to the pieces already referenced, see also Stephen B. Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Se-
curity Assistance on Human Rights Practices, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 246, 278 (1982) (examining leg-
islation conditioning security assistance on human rights practices and finding that if execu-
tive officials are hostile, "even a general rule written with a high degree of precision will
probably have little impact on executive decisions"); and Friman, supra note 20, at 156-57
(describing congressional disappointment with lax or inconsistent executive certifications re-
garding which countries were "fully cooperating" with U.S. narcotics efforts).
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and waiver requirements are easily manipulated and evaded by the Executive and
do little to constrain executive branch policymaking.""
Guantinamo Bay gives reason to believe that this account is wrong.
B. The Certification Requirements at Guantcinamo Bay
The detention facility at Guantinamo Bay was established in January 2002
to hold and interrogate Al Qaeda and Taliban terror suspects." The prison
quicldy became a target of fierce criticism by the human rights community, and
Barack Obama campaigned for President on the promise to close it." Central to
his closure strategy was first shrinking the prison by transferring less dangerous
detainees to third-party countries willing to accept them4 0: a smaller prison pop-
ulation would make it both politically and logistically easier to move the remain-
ing detainees somewhere else.4 1
Congress had different ideas. Concerned that President Obama's GuantA-
namo closure plan was not adequately developed, "overwhelming bipartisan ma-
jorities" rejected President Obama's 2009 request for funding to close the
prison.4 2 Congress also imposed transfer restrictions via a supplementary appro-
priations act that required, among other things, that the Executive notify Con-
gress in advance of any transfers abroad.43
In late 2010, Congress used the annual National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) to further tie the hands of the Obama Administration. The bill flatly
37. Note, Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance to Post-Coup States, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2499,
2519 n.117 (2014).
38. John Bellinger, Guantanamo Redux: Why It Was Opened and Why It Should Be Closed (and Not
Enlarged), LAWFARE (Mar. 12, 2017, 5:ol PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/guantanamo
-redux-why-it-was-opened-and-why-it-should-be-closed-and-not-enlarged [http://perma
.cc/C44J-6WY3].
39. See Alyssa Fetini, A Brief History of Gitmo, TIME (Nov. 12, 2008), http://content.time.com
/time/nation/article/o,8599,1858364,oo.html [http://perma.cc/7EY4-HVVF].
40. CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA'S POST-9/11 PRESIDENCY 127 (2015) (" [Presi-
dent Obama] laid out a framework for Guantinamo: Transfer lower-level detainees. Keep
holding the more dangerous ones somewhere but prosecute as many as possible, strongly
preferring civilian trials but retaining military commissions as an option.").
41. Id. at 529.
42. Id. at 129.
43. See Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103(e), 123 Stat. 1859,
1921; see also SAVAGE, supra note 40, at 129.
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prohibited expenditures for the transfer of detainees to the United States. 4 4 Ad-
ditionally, the bill restricted transfers to foreign countries via a certification re-
gime. Previously, Congress had merely required the President to submit a report
that included a risk assessment and mitigation plan before any foreign transfer.45
The new NDAA, however, demanded the Secretary of Defense "personally cer-
tify to Congress, thirty days ahead of any transfer, that the receiving country had
met an extensive list of security conditions."46 Among these was the requirement
that the Secretary of Defense certify that the receiving country had taken the
steps "necessary to ensure that the [transferee] cannot engage or reengage in any
terrorist activity." 47
Subsequent NDAAs somewhat relaxed the certification requirements. In the
2012 and 2013 NDAAs, the Secretary could waive having to certify that "the in-
dividual [could not] engage or reengage in terrorism" if she instead determined
in writing that the risk of recidivism was "substantially mitigate [d]," and that
the transfer was in U.S. national security interests.48 The Secretary was required
to submit the written determination and a statement for its basis to Congress
thirty days in advance of any transfer.49 Beginning with the 2014 NDAA, the
"substantially mitigated" standard became the language of the certification it-
self.so Even with the looser language, the requirements still effectively forced the
Defense Secretary to personally vouch, in writing, for the safety of each trans-
ferred detainee."
44. Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383,
§ 1032, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351.
45. Supplemental Appropriations Act, S 14103(e).
46. SAVAGE, supra note 40, at 327.
47. Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, S 1033(b) (5).
48. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1028(d)(1),
126 Stat. 1632, 1915-16 (2012); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub.
L. No. 112-81, § 1028(d)(1), 125 Stat. 1298, 1568 (2011).
49. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, S 1028(d) (2); National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1028(d)(2).
50. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 1o35(b),
127 Stat. 672, 851-52 (2014) (including in § 1o3 5(b)(1)-(2), for instance, key language about
"mitigating risk" of terrorism and "national security interests" from the National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1028(d)(1)(C)-(D)); see also National Defense Authori-
zation Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1034(a)-(b), 129 Stat. 726, 968; Carl
Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015,
Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 1032, 128 Stat. 3292, 3491 (2014) (leaving the provision unchanged from
the NDAA for fiscal year 2014).
51. Missy Ryan & Adam Goldman, Time Is Running Out for Obama To Fulfill Promise To Close
Guantanamo, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national
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Congress's certification requirements hamstrung the transfer process. Jeh
Johnson, the General Counsel for the Department of Defense, publicly called the
certifications "onerous and near impossible to satisfy"52 and advised Secretary
Robert Gates not to make any." Secretary Gates heeded the advice: he testified
that Congress had put him in an "uncomfortable position" and that the certifi-
cation requirement "raise [d] the bar very high" for transfers.54 He subsequently
made none." Nor did his successor Leon Panetta.5 6 On the date President
Obama signed the first NDAA containing a certification requirement-January
7, 2011-there were eighty-nine men waiting on the recommended-for-transfer
list. For nearly three years, not one would be approved for transfer." The Obama
Administration blamed the certification requirements for the stalled effort."
While subsequent Defense Secretaries Chuck Hagel and Ashton Carter even-
tually made a number of certifications, they were not without significant delay-
and significant arm-twisting. The certifications created friction between a moti-
vated President and his hesitant subordinates. "It got pretty bad, pretty brutal,"
said Secretary Hagel. "I'd get the hell beat out of me all the time on this at the
White House." 9 "The President said, 'I want this done - I want it done now.' I
said, 'I think you'd be disappointed in me, Mr. President, if I just arbitrarily sign
-security/time-is-running-out-for-obama-to-fulfill-promise-to-close-guantanamo/2o15/1o
/o 7 /od42dd2o-6 7 7 8-11e 5 -9223- 7 0cb646o919_story.html [http://perma.cc/JGQ9-XBSC]
("By U.S. law, the defense secretary must personally vouch for the safety of all detainee trans-
fers.").
52. Jeh C. Johnson, Speech to the Heritage Foundation, HERITAGE FOUND. 7 (Oct. 18, 2011), http://
lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/s3fs-public/uploads/2011/10/2011o08_Jeh
-Johnson-Heritage-Speech.pdf [http://perma.cc/CCC6 -C5 98].
53. Bruck, supra note 5.
54. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2012 and the Future Years
Defense Program: Hearings on S. 1253 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 112th Cong. 49
(2011) (statement of Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense).
5s. Bruck, supra note 5.
56. Id.
57. SAVAGE, supra note 40, at 329.
58. Jason Leopold, Here's What the White House's "Secret" Plan To Close Guantanamo Looks Like,
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOUND. (Aug. 22, 2013), http://freedom.press/news-advocacy/heres
-what-the-white-houses-secret-plan-to-close-guantanamo-looks-like [http://perma.cc
/E6WR-ZBA6] (making available the White House Plan for Closing the GuantAnamo
Bay Detention Facility); see also Daniel Klaidman, President Obama's Secret Gitmo Plan,
NEWSWEEK (July 31, 2013), http://www.newsweek.com/2o13/o7/31/president-obamas
-secret-gitmo-plan-237782.html [http://perma.cc/FTU4-H5X7].
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off, based on a political promise. I have a legal obligation to certify certain things
to Congress."'6 0 Secretary Hagel eventually resigned under pressure; media ac-
counts widely reported that frustration with the pace of the transfer process was
a factor in his ouster,61 although Obama Administration officials denied it.6 2
When Carter replaced Hagel, he too initially stalled. Secretary Carter declined to
make a decision on any newly proposed transfers for his first six months,
prompting concern from the White House.63 "Carter doesn't feel comfortable
putting his name on the line, to sign off on them," one Senate aide reported.64 In
an attempt to prevent further delay, White House officials even ambushed Sec-
retary Carter with an unsigned National Security Council memo that ordered
him to make transfer decisions within thirty days of their reaching him; he re-
acted angrily,6 s without explicitly accepting the thirty-day transfer deadline.66
President Obama needed to upbraid Secretary Carter personally before he picked
up the pace of approvals.6 7
6o. Bruck, supra note 5.
61. See, e.g., Helene Cooper, Hagel Resigns UnderPressure as Global Crises Test Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/hagel-said-to-be-stepping-down
-as-defense-chief-under-pressure.html [http://perma.cc/6SST-ERIE] (citing Mr. Hagel's
delays in transferring detainees); De Luce, supra note 59 ("The arguments over Guantinamo
detainees were cited by White House officials as the last straw that led to Hagel having to step
down."); Adam Goldman & Missy Ryan, Issue of Where To Move Guantanamo Detainees Threat-
ens Closure Plan, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/national-security/guantanamo-closure-plan-suffers-setback-over-us-site-for-detainees
/2015/08/10/154oc2eo-3f68-11e5-9561-4b3dc93e3b9a story.html [http://perma.cc/8DVF
-8XEZ] ("White House pressure to approve transfers more quickly created friction with then-
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, which contributed to his early resignation last year.");
Charles Levinson & David Rohde, Special Report: Pentagon Thwarts Obamas Efforts To Close
Guantanamo, REUTERS (Dec. 29, 2015, 5:2o AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa
-gitmo-release-special-report-idUSKBNoUB1Bo2o151229 [http://perma.cc/L57H-822Q]
("The Pentagon's slow pace in approving transfers was a factor in President Obama's decision
to remove Hagel in February, former administration officials said.").
62. SAVAGE, supra note 40, at 530.
63. Charlie Savage, Obama's Plan for Guantuinamo Is Seen as Faltering, N.Y. TiMES (July 21, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/22/us/politics/obamas-plan-for-guantanamo-is-seen
-faltering.html [http://perma.cc/LC7K-HIEQ].
64. Tim Mak & Nancy A. Youssef, The Pentagon Is Keeping Half of Gitmo Locked Up -Against the
White House's Wishes, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 9, 2015, 8:53 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com
/the-pentagon-is-keeping-half-of- gitmo-locked-upagainst-the-white-houses-wishes
[http://perma.cc/ZD6Y-9W7P].
65. Bruck, supra note 5-
66. SAVAGE, supra note 40, at 554.
67. Levinson & Rohde, supra note 61.
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While President Obama ultimately transferred 196 detainees out of GuantA-
namo Bay,68 he failed on his promise to close the base. Forty-one prisoners re-
mained. 6 9 And while Congress's certification requirements were not the sole ob-
stacle, they were plainly a serious one. President Obama's efforts to close the
prison relied on first shrinking its population. Transfers, then, were at the heart
of closure strategy70 and time was of the essence: as Cliff Sloan, the State De-
partment's Special Envoy for Guantinamo Closure, said, "every month counts"
because "the path to closure demands substantial progress in moving people
from Guantinamo."" Yet multiple Secretaries of Defense dragged their feet in
the face of daunting certification requirements that would have made them "per-
sonally accountable if something [went] wrong."72 While Secretary Carter ulti-
mately made a number of transfers in the waning days of the Obama Admin-
istration, the prior delays helped run out the clock.71
The case of Guantinamo challenges the academic literature's conclusion that
certification requirements cannot meaningfully impede executive priorities.
Closing the prison had been one of President Obama's earliest and most public
promises. But in the face of Congress's certification requirements, President
Obama's Secretaries of Defense did not, as the existing literature would predict,
68. Letter from Barack Obama, President of the United States, to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate (Jan. 19, 2017) (available at Of-




70. As Lee Wolosky, the State Department's Special Envoy for Closing Guantinamo, said,
" [w]hat we're doing to make [closure] happen is transfers." Bruck, supra note 5.
71. Charlie Savage, Decaying Guantinamo Defies Closing Plans, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2o4/09/0/us/politics/decaying-guantanamo-defies-closing-plans
.html [http://perma.cc/2DV5-PP9S]; see also SAVAGE, supra note 40, at 6262 (quoting Robert
M. Chesney, who worked on detainee policy for the Obama Administration, saying, "What-
ever hope there is [for closure] depends on quick progress in transferring as many detainees
as possible").
72. Savage, supra note 63.
73. See Kathleen Hennessey & Ben Fox, Obama Administration Rushing To Shrink Ranks at Guan-
tanamo, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 5, 2016, 9:01 AM), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2o16
/Obama-administration rushing to-shrink ranksatGuantanamo/id-aell9704ebd5428
aa5ecoo45d7c9e59b [http://perma.cc/BWZ8-3CDS] (noting that the Obama Administration
is "running out of time and options" and that while the administration has picked up the pace,
"it looks to be [too] little, too late to close the prison").
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"simply go through the formality of filing the required papers."74 Were certifica-
tions little more than routine red tape, one would expect they would not have
been such a sticking point. Guantinamo suggests that a new account is needed.
II. CERTIFICATIONS AND BLAME
A. Localizing Accountability Through Certifications
The academic literature on certifications dismisses their potential to control
the Executive, and therefore struggles to account for those requirements' role in
thwarting the closure of Guantinamo Bay. This shortcoming stems from the lit-
erature overlooking a critical feature of certifications. Fundamentally, certifica-
tions should be understood as tools to localize accountability for a given judgment.
As a consequence, certifications heighten the certifier's risk of personal blame
should that judgment be wrong. Central to blame is the belief that a harm could
have been avoided but for the actions or omissions of an identifiable actor." By
conditioning governmental action upon the judgment of a particular individual,
certifications make that individual a direct cause of that action, thereby setting
the stage for the attribution of blame should harm result.
Certifications' ability to connect a decision to a named individual stands in
stark contrast to the anonymity of prototypical bureaucratic decision-making.
Hannah Arendt memorably called bureaucracy "rule by Nobody,"76 where it is
"impossible to localize responsibility"" and there is no one "to answer for what
is being done."7 While Arendt's description was offered as a critique, the anon-
ymous nature of a bureaucracy helps to insulate individuals from "extraneous
pressures"7 such as personal blame. In doing so, bureaucracy enables decisions
that might be sound policy but are too risky for any individual to make alone.so
74. Horton & Sellier, supra note 21, at 859.
75. HOOD, supra note lo, at 6.
76. HANNAH ARENDT, On Violence, in CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 103, 137 (1972).
77. Id. at 138.
78. Id. at 137-38; see also Dennis F. Thompson, Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem
of Many Hands, 74 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 905, 907-08 (1980) (arguing that collective responsi-
bility weakens democratic accountability).
79. ROBERT MERTON, Bureaucratic Structure and Personality, in SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUC-
TURE 249, 250 (1968); see also STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIous CIRCLE: TOWARD EF-
FECTIVE RISK REGULATION 62-63 (1993) (describing how bureaucratic insulation can assist in
better decision-making).
80. See HOOD, supra note lo, at 98 (noting the use of group decision-making in high-stakes situ-
ations, such as assessing whether children are at risk of abuse or the risk posed by pedophiles
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While bureaucratic decision-making distributes the risk of blame across a
system - there is safety in numbers and safety in anonymity" - certifications
pierce that bureaucratic safety by plucking an individual out of the herd. By lo-
calizing accountability in a single person, certification requirements concentrate
risk in that person. Personal responsibility brings personal vulnerability. More-
over, these certifications must be memorialized in writing, heightening the vul-
nerability: should things go wrong, there is a clear record both of the certifier's
responsibility and of her poor judgment.82 This vulnerability changes the certi-
fier's overall decision-making calculus; under the right set of factors, the deci-
sionmaker may become unwilling to make a decision that she would have made
otherwise."
Indeed, GuantAnamo provides an example of the contrast between group
and individual decision-making. Before a proposed transfer even reached the
Defense Secretary's desk, other officials had already determined that the transfer
was appropriate. Under the terms of a 2011 executive order, prior to any transfer,
a parole-like board of senior officials from six agencies had to determine by con-
sensus that continued detention was not "necessary to protect against a signifi-
cant threat to the security of the United States."84 But Congress's NDAAs specif-
ically noted that these recommendations were non-binding and that "the
released from custody); see also Rt. Kent Weaver, The Politics ofBlame Avoidance, 6 J. PUB. POL'Y
371, 388-89 (1986) (describing how, where there is no way of avoiding hard choices, politi-
cians can "circle the wagons" to ensure "no one has to stick their neck out").
81. See generally HOOD, supra note lo, at 97-100 (describing herding).
82. See SUZANNE GARMENT, SCANDAL: THE CRISIS OF MISTRUST IN AMERICAN POLITICS 295
(1991); see also id. at 1 ("'Nothing goes on paper.' The political appointee was explaining how
top managers in her federal agency make their official decisions.').
83. Worth exploring further, though noted only in passing here, are the bureaucratic counter-
measures, contemplated or taken, that attempted to de-localize responsibility for the Guanti-
namo certifications and so dilute the risk. Compare SAVAGE, supra note 40, at 526-28, and Jason
M. Breslow, Chuck Hagel: Closing Guantanamo Is an "Imperfect Process," PBS (Feb. 21, 2017),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/chuck-hagel-closing-guantanamo-is-an
-imperfect-process [http://perma.cc/G3PL-D7BB] (recounting Attorney General Eric
Holder's proposal that the entire National Security Council sign the certification), with HOOD,
supra note io, at 97-100 (describing "herding" - collective decision-making - as a tactic to re-
duce blame on any given individual); compare Memorandum from Susan Rice, Assistant to
the President for Nat'l Sec. Affairs, to the Secretary of Defense, "Guidance on Guantanamo
Bay Detainee Transfers" 1-2 (May 24, 2014) (defining "substantially mitigate [d]" as a checklist
of potential steps), with HOOD, supra note lo, at 93-97 (describing "protocolization" as a tool
for limiting blame for the faulty exercise of discretion).
84. Exec. Order No. 13,567, 3 C.F.R. § 13567 (2012). Prior to the establishment of the parole-like
board via the 2011 order, a six-agency task force reviewed detainees for transfer eligibility.
Charlie Savage, The Fight over Guantinamo's Parole Board, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17,
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Secretary of Defense is responsible for any final decision to release or transfer an
individual."" Secretary Hagel acutely felt the difference between such group de-
cision-making and his own ultimate responsibility, a weight which he expressed
in multiple public interviews: "Everybody had a role in this, but again, it rolls
back on one individual";86 "My name is going on that document. That's a big
responsibility."" And, as Charlie Savage wrote, Secretary Hagel's "risk-aversion
and careful deliberation, stemming from the fact that he could be seen as per-
sonally accountable if any released detainee killed someone, was precisely what
the drafters of the transfer-restrictions law had hoped to achieve.""
The existing literature overlooks certifications' power to create this personal
accountability. Scholars argue that certifications are a weak tool because there is
no effective way for the other branches to review the accuracy of the judgment
in question;" without such review, the argument goes, the Executive can largely
do as it pleases. But certification requirements demand not only a judgment but
also a person to vouch for thatjudgment. The attendant risk of individual blame can
2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/us/politics/guantanamo-bay-parole-periodic
-review-board.html [http://perma.cc/RZT9-Q9R2].
85. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1023 (b)(1)-(2),
125 Stat. 1298, 1564 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note).
86. Breslow, supra note 83. For an interesting potential analogue, California voters passed a 1988
constitutional amendment requiring the Governor to review cases where the state parole
board recommends a convicted murderer be released. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8(b). The amend-
ment was intended to hold the Governor accountable in a Willie Horton-style case of high
profile recidivism. While the law passed without much attention, the effects were dramatic:
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger reversed seventy-five percent of cases; Governor Gray Da-
vis reversed ninety-nine percent. Said one former head of the California prison system: "I
don't know that inmates believed, or even practitioners believed, that the governor would
reject as many cases as they did when it initially passed." This American Life: Long Shot, CHI.
PUB. RADIO (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/398
/transcript [http://perma.cc/2GP6-6KHQ].
87. Charlie Savage & Helene Cooper, Under Pressure, Hagel Promises To Act on Guantinamo Trans-
fers, N.Y. TIMEs (May 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/3o/us/hagel-sets-his
-own-timetable-on-deciding-guantanamo-transfers.html [http://perma.cc/NHT4-TNSE];
see also, e.g., Breslow, supra note 83 (discussing Secretary Hagel's description of how the NDAA
"put the responsibility of certifying the detainees ... solely on the shoulders of the secretary
of defense"); Rebecca Shabad, Report: Pentagon Officials Have Slowed Process To Close
Gitmo, CBS NEws (Dec. 28, 2015, 5:33 PM) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/report-pentagon
-officials-have-slowed-process-to-close-gitmo [http://perma.cc/MTUS-UJWQ] ("[B]y law,
I [Hagel] am the one official in government charged with certification of release of detainees.
I take that responsibility very seriously.").
88. SAVAGE, supra note 40, at 519.
89. Chinen, supra note 6, at 272; Griffin, supra note 21, at 210; Quint, supra note 9, at 827, 827
n.221.
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impede executive action even when formal review by Congress or the courts is
unlikely.
Chinen likely comes closest to addressing certifications' relationship to ac-
countability and blame. He examines how, by allowing Congress to pass the
buck on difficult decisions, certifications shift risk from the legislative to the ex-
ecutive branch. But Chinen does not consider whether this risk transfer might
change the decision that is ultimately made. Moreover, in his discussion of risk
shifting, he treats the executive as monolithic. The executive, however, is not
monolithic - it is made up of individuals, and only one of those individuals must
put her name to a certification, with the accompanying risk of blame. By ignor-
ing how certifications can shape decisions by localizing accountability in specific
actors, the existing literature underestimates their potential power.
B. Predicting the Power of Certification Requirements
Once certifications are understood as a means of localizing accountability in
a particular actor, it is possible to theorize factors that make them effective - that
is, their ability to influence the Executive to behave in ways it would have other-
wise resisted. Certifications can be effective in different ways. They might, for
example, raise the political costs of a decision by forcing the certifier to take per-
sonal ownership for it; such heightened costs could affect the timing of the de-
cision or even its actual outcome.9 0 Or certifications might cause delay, as at
Guantinamo, by making the certifier more cautious when making difficult judg-
ments. But generally, a certification's effectiveness will largely depend upon
heightening the certifier's risk of blame while diminishing the certifier's chance
for credit.
1. Heightening the Risk ofBlame
Certifiers will be more reluctant to certify when they perceive a greater risk
of blame. This risk of blame depends upon their perception of the amount of
potential blame they might have to endure because of their certification and the
likelihood they will actually have to endure it.
The first factor - the amount of blame that might be visited upon a certifier -
is likely the most important in determining whether a certification will have bite.
go. Meyer's suggestion of "shadow" fact-finding committees and Chinen's suggestions of nar-
rower, more objective certification criteria can be understood as attempts to constrain the Ex-
ecutive by raising the political costs of certifications that run roughshod over the truth. See
Meyer, supra note 35, at 101; Chinen supra note 6, at 274.
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The amount of blame largely depends upon the issue's salience to the deci-
sionmaker's constituents. Some certification requirements, while perhaps con-
cerning important issues, involve obscure policy determinations that are unlikely
to attract large-scale attention": an erroneous or unpopular certification as to
the sources of funding for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organi-
zation,9 2 for example, is less likely to attract significant blame because the issue
flies below the public radar. But other certifications may attract overwhelming
blame, particularly in a media environment that is hungry for scandal" and a
public discourse often dominated by a politics of fear.94
The Guantinamo Bay certifications, for example, occurred against the back-
drop of widespread fears of terrorism - were a detainee to recidivate, the Defense
Secretary would have faced an enormous backlash. In fact, former British Prime
Minister Tony Blair was dragged back into the British tabloids, ten years after
leaving power, for having secured the 2004 release of a British Guantinamo de-
tainee who later detonated himself in a 2017 Baghdad suicide bombing. Read one
tabloid headline: "The ISIS suicide bomber YOU paid ilmillion! British fighter
who blew himself up in Mosul was compensated for serving time in Gitmo -
after Tony Blair got him freed - then fled to join ISIS."" Faced with the very real
prospect of being publicly excoriated for a bad decision, it is not surprising that
officials were reluctant to risk their professional and personal reputations.9 6 In-
deed, Charles Stimson, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for De-
tainee Affairs, characterized the certification requirements as a "poison pill": "It
91. Cf ROBERT D. BEHN, RETHINKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 84 (2001) (noting how a
Senator's attempts to publicize fraud "got the most press - the most public attention - not for
the million-dollar mistakes, but for the small ones that everyone could understand"); Mary
Douglas, Risk as a Forensic Resource, in RISK 1, 10 (Edward J. Burger, Jr. ed., 1993) (describing
the evaluation of an outcome as "a political, aesthetic, and moral matter").
92. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-118, ill Stat. 2386, 2399-2400 (1997).
93. GARMENT, supra note 82, at 57.
94. FRANK FUREDI, THE POLITICS OF FEAR 1 (2005).
95. Alexander Robertson et al., The ISIS Suicide Bomber YOU Paid zimillion! British Fighter Who
Blew Himself Up in Mosul Was Compensated for Serving Time in Gitmo -After Tony Blair Got
Him Freed-Then Fled To join ISIS, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 22, 2017, 7:10 PM), http://www
.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4244444/British-ISIS-fanatic-pictured-grinning-bomb-attack
.html [http://perma.cc/MSW5-N4VE].
96. Cf SAVAGE, supra note 40, at 183 (noting that officials who try to halt national security pro-
grams put themselves at risk of blame for a future attack that the program might have pre-
vented).
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was basically, 'Go ahead, I dare you.' No [S]ecretary of [D]efense wants his name
on that piece of paper."97
Nor are certifications potent only in the context of international terrorism.
The Adam Walsh Act, for instance, prohibits American citizens who have been
convicted of certain sex offenses against minors from filing a family-based im-
migrant petition "unless the Secretary of Homeland Security, in the Secretary's
sole and unreviewable discretion, determines that the citizen poses no risk" to
the petition's beneficiary.98 Top officials are particularly likely to want to avoid
direct responsibility for outcomes that risk media firestorms (such as the re-of-
fense of a convicted sex offender); they would prefer to set themselves up as
"global resource allocators and after-the-fact scrutinizers" rather than direct de-
cisionmakers.9 9 Indeed, in the case of Walsh Act certifications, the Secretary has
delegated his authority.100 Even still, petitioners bear the burden of demonstrat-
ing "beyond any reasonable doubt" that they pose no risk to the beneficiary. o
Adjudicators, moreover, may reject petitions on their own, while approvals must
first be cleared by two supervisors.102 Unsurprisingly, almost no petitions are
approved. 10
It also seems that multiple high-profile foreign affairs decisions during the
early Trump Administration have been influenced at least in part by President
Donald Trump's reluctance to make certifications that could be politically costly
with valued constituencies. While a candidate, for instance, President Trump
fiercely campaigned against the Obama Administration's nuclear deal with
97. Phil Hirschkorn, 11 Years in Guantanamo Without Trial or Charges, CBS NEws (May 31,
2013, 6:35 PM) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/11-years-in-guantanamo-without-trial-or
-charges [http://perma.cc/H6MU-C5931.
98. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 20o6, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 402, 120 Stat.
587, 622 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (1) (A) (viii) (I)).
99. HOOD, supra note lo, at 140.
ioo. Roland v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 850 F.3 d 625, 627 n.1 (4 th Cir. 2017). No
such delegation of responsibility was possible with the Guantinamo certifications. National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No, 112-81, § 1023 (b)(2).
101. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. HQDOMO 7 0/1-P, Guidance for Adjudication of Family-
Based Petitions (Feb. 8, 2007).
102. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. HQ7 0/1-P, Transmittal of SOP forAdjudication of Family-
Based Petitions (Sept. 24, 2008).
103. Bremer v. Johnson, 834 F.3d 925, 929 (8th Cir. 2016) (noting that the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Service has determined that judgments of "no risk" should be "rare"); Jennie
Guilfoyle, Updates on Family-Based Immigration from the VSC and NVC, CATHOLIC LEGAL
IMMIGR. NETwoRK, http://cliniclegal.org/resources/articles-clinic/updates-family-based
-immigration-vsc-and-nvc [http://perma.cc/928J-F4ER] (reporting that about one percent
of petitions were approved in 2012).
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Iran.104 The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, however, demanded that the
President certify every ninety days that Iran was in compliance with the deal;
that the suspension of U.S. sanctions was both "appropriate and proportionate"
to Iran's actions to end its illicit nuclear program; and that the suspension of
sanctions was "vital" to American national security.10 s After his election, Presi-
dent Trump twice "reluctantly" certified the deal. But the President "could not
bring himself to do that every 90 days," even if international inspectors and
American intelligence agencies agreed Iran was in compliance with the deal.106
In October 2017, President Trump overruled his top national security adviserso7
and refused to certify that the suspension of sanctions was "appropriate and pro-
portionate" to Iran's actions,o thereby empowering Congress to fast-track a bill
to re-impose the lifted sanctions.109 Here, the structure of the certification re-
quirement -which effectively required President Trump to affirmatively and re-
peatedly endorse a deal he had loudly denounced- created political costs he was
not willing to accept. 10
Similarly, certification requirements shaped President Trump's decision to
recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. In 1995, Congress passed the Jerusa-
lem Embassy Act, which dramatically slashed State Department funding until
the President moved the American embassy in Israel to Jerusalem."' The Presi-
dent, though, could postpone the funding cuts without moving the embassy by
determining every six months that postponement was "necessary to protect the
104. Mark Landler & David E. Sanger, Trump Disavows Nuclear Deal, But Doesn't Scrap It, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/13/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear
-deal.html [http://perma.cc/6KB8-CUR-2].
105. Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-1 7 , § 13 5 (d)(6).
io6. Landler & Sanger, supra note 104.
107. Mark Landler & David E. Sanger, Trump To Force Congress To Act on Nuclear Deal, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 5, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear
-deal.html [http://perma.cc/37JV-WDCT].
io8. Id. (reporting that President Trump warned aides he would not certify the deal a third time).
iog. Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act § 13 5 (d) (6).
110. Vali Nasr, the Dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, said, "He
doesn't want to certify the Iran deal for more domestic reasons than international ones. He
doesn't want to certify that any piece of the Obama strategy is working." Anne Gearan, "He
Threw a Fit": Trump's Anger Over Iran Deal Forced Aides To Scramble for a Compromise, WASH.
POST (Oct. 11, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/he-threw-a-fit-trumps
-anger-over-iran-deal-forced-aides-to-scramble-for-a-compromise/2o17/1o/11/6218174C
-ae94-11e7-9e58-e6288544af98_story.html [http://perma.cc/PX76-AX2T].
i. Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-45, § 3 (b), lo9 Stat. 398, 399.
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national security interests of the United States."112 Past Presidents had cam-
paigned on moving the embassy; upon confronting the diplomatic sensitivity of
the issue, however, they ultimately reneged on their pledges and instead repeat-
edly issued the national security waivers." President Trump also promised to
move the embassy during the 2016 presidential campaign. While he signed the
first waiver "grudgingly," influential supporters were "deeply frustrated" by his
doing so.114 With the approach of the second waiver deadline, he indicated to
aides that he would not sign a second waiver11 5 and pressed them for more op-
tions. 116 In December 2017, on the week of the second waiver deadline, President
Trump announced the formal recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital and be-
gan a plan to relocate the embassy."' Again, the Jerusalem Embassy Act's waiver
was structured in such a way as to force the President to personally, affirmatively,
and repeatedly delay the fulfillment of an important campaign promise. When
President Trump was "[f] aced with disappointing evangelical and pro-Israel
backers ... or alarming allies and Arab leaders while jeopardizing his own peace
initiative, the [P] resident sided with his key supporters."1
One might argue that President Trump's actions were independent of the
certification requirements, given that he had campaigned against the Iran deal
and in favor of moving the embassy to Jerusalem. Perhaps he would have taken
his own actions on these issues in due course. But the timing of both the Iran
and embassy decisions, along with reported accounts of his decision-making,
112. Id. at§7(a).
113. Josh Dawsey et al., Trump Had for Months Been Determined to Move U.S. Embassy toJerusalem




114. Mark Landler, For Trump, an Embassy inJerusalem Is a Political Decision, Not a Diplomatic One,
N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 6, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2o17/12/o6/us/politics/trump
-embassy-jerusalem-israel.html [http://perma.cc/V9LY-T9TL].
115. Dawsey et al., supra note 113.
n6. Landler, supra note 114.
117. Id. While President Trump ultimately signed the second waiver, he made clear he was setting
in motion plans to move the embassy, which mollified supporters. Id.
n8. Id.
ig. See Landler & Sanger, supra note 107; Landler, supra note 114 (pointing out that President
Trump's handling of the Jerusalem embassy issue was "not unlike his handling of the nuclear
deal with Iran" and reporting that " [w] hen the six-month clock expired this month, Mr.
Trump was determined to leave himself more options"); David Nakamura, Trump Recognizes
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suggest that certifications played a role in forcing President Trump's hand. It is
fair to conclude that the rhythm of the certification requirements, which de-
manded President Trump repeatedly affirm positions opposed by his political
supporters, pressured the President to make significant foreign policy choices on
a schedule he might not have chosen.12 0
These two cases illustrate, then, another relevant point: the structure of a
certification influences the amount of blame incurred.121 Since people tend to
blame actors more harshly for sins of commission rather than omission,122 the
certification's "default rule" matters.123 The Iran deal certification requirements,
for example, likely would have been weaker if its structure had been inverted-
had President Trump been required to make a certification to disavow the Iran
deal, rather than to make certifications that repeatedly affirmed the deal, he likely
would not have felt the pressure he did. Similarly, imagine a counterfactual
where the Defense Secretary were still responsible for ensuring transferred
GuantAnamo detainees did not recidivate, but where the transfers approved by
the parole-like board would be automatically approved unless the Secretary
-da9d-11e7-a841-2o66faf731ef story.html [http://perma.cc/8E66-GYSM] (noting that Pres-
ident Trump was "anxious" to move forward on a declaration on Jerusalem as the deadline for
the second waiver approached).
120. One might argue that the fact that other Presidents bit the bullet and made the Jerusalem
certifications -like the fact that Secretary Carter ultimately made a number of transfers - call
into doubt whether the certification requirements actually shaped these decisions. But the sa-
lience of blame risk can differ across individuals and across circumstances; the varying sus-
ceptibility to this pressure does not mean that such pressure does not exist. See HOOD, supra
note lo, at 8 (comparing a politician on the eve of a close race with one on the eve of retirement
and noting that "not everyone can be expected to care equally about all types of blame in all
circumstances"); Weaver, supra note So, at 377 (making a similar point).
121. See Weaver, supra note So, at 381-82 (describing how the manner in which political choices
are structured can be used to generate or avoid blame).
122. See, e.g., Peter DeScioli et al., The Omission Strategy, 22 PSYCHOL. SCl. 442, 442 (2011) (finding
that "people condemn others less harshly when a moral offense occurs by omission rather than
by commission, even when intentions are controlled" and concluding that actors choose omis-
sions to avoid condemnation); Mark Spranca et al., Omission and Commission in Judgment and
Choice, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 76 (1991) (finding that subjects considered com-
missions causing harm to be worse than omissions causing harm, even when holding the ac-
tor's intention constant).
123. Cf Griffin, supra note 21, at 174 (contrasting human rights provisions that prohibited aid until
the President made a favorable determination, with other laws that provided aid unless the
Executive made an unfavorable determination); Weaver, supra note So, at 380 (discussing
how legislators sought to avoid directly voting for their own pay raises - a politically losing
proposition -by creating a process for automatic pay increases; when this attempt failed,
however, they were forced to vote on the pay increases directly and so voted against them).
1435
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
made a certification that affirmatively blocked the transfer.124 Because the Secre-
tary's error would be one of omission rather than commission, were a detainee
to recidivate, the Secretary likely would face less blame.
In addition to the amount of blame a certifier expects she might face, the de-
cision to certify will also depend on her perception of the likelihood she will actu-
ally face it. With certification requirements such as those in the Iran deal or Je-
rusalem Embassy Act, this calculation is straightforward: blame is assured, since
it is the very act of certifying that incurs this blame.125 In cases such as the Guan-
tinamo certifications, however, the assessment is more complex. Not all certifi-
cations would trigger blame, only those where a detainee recidivated. In other
words, the likelihood of blame in such circumstances turns on whether the cer-
tifier's judgment might be proven obviously wrong.
Certifications with objective criteria will be better yardsticks in gauging
whether a certifier has made a wrong judgment. In general, certifications will
involve either judgments based on policy criteria (such as whether an action is
in the "national interest") or empirical criteria (such as whether a detainee "can-
not" reengage in terrorism).126 Judgments based on policy criteria tend to be less
constraining because the criteria's meanings are often harder to pin down - rea-
sonable people might differ as to what is in the national interest, for example.
Because such standards are broad and contestable, they afford the decisionmaker
greater latitude in justifying her decision.127 It is easier, however, to challenge
the accuracy of empirical judgments.128 Concrete and ascertainable requirements
124. Some certifications are set up this way. See, e.g., Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-118, i Stat. 2386, 2394 (1997)
(empowering the President to withhold appropriated funds from Bosnia and Herzegovina if
he certifies that the country has not complied with aspects of a peace agreement); Interna-
tional Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113 724(c), 95 Stat.
1519, 1553 (cutting assistance to the Nicaraguan government if the President determines, inter
alia, that the Nicaraguan government is aiding international terrorism).
125. But see Weaver, supra note So, at 381 (noting that voters may fail to link policymakers to
choices they have made).
126. Cf Chinen, supra note 6, at 225-26 (noting some certification requirements are primarily state-
ments of policy, others are primarily statements of fact, and others are a mixture of fact, policy,
and sometimes law).
127. See id. at 274-75 (arguing that certification requirements should be either "very narrow" or
"very broad,' and pointing to a "national interest" certification as an example of a broad cer-
tification requirement).
128. Other scholars point out that even some empirical criteria can offer significant room for exec-
utive discretion. Meyer proposes creating still more objective standards, such as standards
based on specific numerical quantities. He suggests, for instance, a statute could impose for-
eign aid restrictions based on whether a specified number of people had been victimized rather
than on whether a country engaged in a "consistent pattern" of human rights abuses. Meyer,
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are therefore more constraining because they expose the certifier to the embar-
rassment and blame that accompanies an obviously wrong judgment.12 9 They
also likely increase the administrative burden on the Executive because the deci-
sionmaker will invest more time and resources into marshaling the information
required to make a confident judgment.o Secretary Hagel, for instance, de-
scribed the scrutiny he would apply to each of the Guantinamo transfers before
making a certification:
I wanted assurance from my security people that in fact they had seen
physically where these people were going to be, who was going to mon-
itor them, how often the monitoring, what kind of relationships would
they have, would they have cell phones, would they have Internet, what
would they be doing, how would they be provided living accommoda-
tions. All those are factors that go into the ultimate decision."'
Such burdensome fact-finding can cause delay; having to make many such cer-
tifications will only compound the burden.
Certifications will be especially perilous when they demand a high degree of
certainty about matters that, while concrete, are nonetheless uncertain. Predic-
tions about the future - that a detainee "cannot" engage in terrorism or that a
person poses "no risk" to family members - are especially fraught.132 At the time
of such a certification, it will be hard for the decisionmaker to know whether her
judgment is right; with hindsight, it will be easy to prove whether her judgment
was wrong. We can accordingly expect certifiers to be reluctant to make such
certifications. And in situations where a certifier is required to make numerous
certifications, as at Guantinamo, the certifier will have to confront the challenge
of cumulative probability -low probability events, individually rare, grow like-
lier in the aggregate as the sample size increases. Where constituents have zero
supra note 35, at 101; see also Chinen, supra note 6, at 274 (suggesting that, with respect to an
anti-narcotics certification, "Congress could impose numerical criteria, such as numbers of
drug seizures, extraditions, etc., to determine whether a country has cooperated" with Amer-
ican anti-narcotics efforts).
129. Chinen, supra note 6, at 274 (arguing narrower criteria for certifications would deter the Ex-
ecutive from making controversial certifications because of the possibility of embarrassment
or being caught in deception).
130. Id. at 271 (noting that certification requirement "impose a burden on the executive branch, in
terms of the administrative costs of compliance, formulation, and implementation of policy").
131. Breslow, supra note 83.
132. As a consequence, it will generally be less onerous for a certifier to vouch that certain proce-
dures were followed than to vouch that certain outcomes will be achieved. See HOOD, supra
note lo, at 93-97 (discussing protocolization).
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tolerance for error, as can be the case in national security matters, the likelihood
of a career-ending mistake grows.
In short, a certifier can sum up their blame risk by asking two commonsense
questions: How likely am I to be blamed? And how bad will it be if I am?
2. Minimizing the Chance for Credit
One might argue that because risks and rewards are symmetric, mere ac-
countability for a decision should not affect the outcome: while a decisionmaker
might court blame for a bad decision, they equally might have the opportunity
to claim credit for a good one.' But public officials are often risk-averse, since
governmental success tends to be ignored while failure receives withering atten-
tion. 134As one author wrote, officials "recognize that, if someone is holding them
accountable, two things can happen: When they do something good, nothing
happens. But when they screw up, all hell can break loose. Those whom we want
to hold accountable have a clear understanding of what accountability means:
Accountability means punishment.""'
Accordingly, for certifiers, the chance for credit is probably the less important
half of the ledger. Nevertheless, the designer of a certification regime can
strengthen a certification requirement not only by increasing the downside risk,
but also by minimizing the certifier's chance for any benefit. Calculating this op-
portunity for credit is broadly similar to calculating the danger for blame: the
certifier must assess how much credit is on offer and how likely they are to get
it. Accordingly, this paper omits an analogous discussion.
One point worth exploring specifically, though, is how a certification re-
quirement's location within the executive branch can diminish the certifier's
chance for credit. Different entities within the executive branch have different
institutional interests. 13 6 The President, for example, is accountable for both the
costs and benefits of a decision by virtue of being responsible for the entirety of
the executive branch."' But even under the umbrella of a unitary Executive,
133. See BEHN, supra note 91, at 6 (critiquing definitions of accountability that equally emphasize
blame and praise).
134. See HOOD, supra note lo, at 9-13; Weaver, supra note So, at 371, 376 (arguing politicians are
more motivated to avoid blame than to claim credit and that political appointees and bureau-
crats are motivated to avoid blame too, respectively).
135. BEHN, supra note 91, at 3.
136. Allison, supra note lo, at 711.
137. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 94 (1994) ("Accountability and avoidance of factionalism, then, are two central val-
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heads of individual departments often have narrower (and sometimes compet-
ing) interests.' Therefore, where the certification is located can structure the
substantive decision by foregrounding some considerations while diminishing
others. Certification requirements will become more of an obstacle when foisted
upon an official who, by virtue of her institutional role, experiences only the
downside risks of certification without the corresponding benefits.
Guantinamo illustrates how the location of a certification requirement can
shape whether certifications are made."' The State Department, responsible for
America's foreign policy, experienced Guantinamo as a diplomatic liability and
stood to gain from its closure.14 0 The Department of Defense, while deeply in-
tertwined with American foreign policy, is not primarily responsible for it; it is
responsible, however, for the safety of American troops around the globe. And
so, it is unsurprising that institutionally, the Department of Defense would be
more reluctant to transfer Guantinamo detainees, since it experiences much of
the downside risk without the corresponding benefit. As Hagel asked, " [I]s there
a bias the military would have, being more rigid in releasing some of these
guys ... ? Not many State Department people get killed- some do. Not many
White House people get killed. It's [Department of Defense] people that get
killed."141 In choosing the Defense Secretary as the certifier, Congress tilted the
playing field to ensure that special weight would be given to interests militating
against transfers.142
ues of the framers' original executive."); Susan M. Davies, Comment, Congressional Encroach-
ment on Executive Branch Communications, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1299-1300 (1990) (discuss-
ing the Framers' creation of the office of the President as a politically accountable figure in
whom all executive power would reside).
138. See Allison, supra note lo, at 711. For a general discussion of bureaucratic politicking, see id. at
708-12.
139. Cf Cohen, supra note 36, at 256-62 (illustrating how different interests can shape how actors
perceive costs and benefits by offering an account of the "intense bureaucratic warfare" within
President Carter's State Department over the conditioning of security assistance upon human
rights concerns; while high political officials pushed for prioritizing human rights concerns,
career officials consistently opposed such prioritization because they were not particularly
concerned about human rights, and such prioritization jeopardized the maintenance of good
relations with the governments in question, which they saw as their primary goal).
140. Bruck, supra note 5.
141. Id.; see also Kay & Youssef, supra note 64 (noting speculation that President Obama was con-
sidering asking Congress for an amendment to the certification requirement so that the Pres-
ident could issue the certifications rather than the Defense Secretary).
142. The certification's location may also be strategically important for a reason unrelated to risk-
reward calculus - it may simply provide another tool for a bureaucracy to fight a policy that it
already opposed. There were, for instance, widespread reports that elements of the Defense
Department opposed the closure of Guantinamo. See, e.g., Levinson & Rohde, supra note 61;
1439
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
III. WEAPONIZING BLAME: THE AMERICAN SAFE ACT
Not all certification requirements are as dramatic as those used at GuantA-
namo. Many certifications may, in fact, be the ineffective formalities that com-
mentators have posited.143 While a certification's effectiveness is scalar rather
than binary, the prior Part argued that we can expect certification requirements
to be more powerful when they require the decisionmaker to (1) attest to partic-
ularized and uncertain facts (2) at the risk of overwhelming blame with (3) little
chance for credit. The certification regime at Guantinamo was one attempt to
deploy such powerful certifications. But it has not been the only attempt. An
examination of the American SAFE Act -a bill that would have imposed crip-
pling certification requirements on the Iraqi and Syrian refugee programs - of-
fers another example of how Congress can craft a certification regime that effec-
tively weaponizes blame to constrain executive action. And this examination also
reveals that while some members of Congress themselves do not fully under-
stand the power of certifications, others understand it too well.
A. An Uncertifiable Certification
In November 2015, coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris left 130 dead and
hundreds wounded.144 It was the worst terrorist attack in Europe in eleven
years.14 5 Shortly thereafter, Republican Representative Michael McCaul, Chair-
man of the House Homeland Security Committee, introduced H.R. 4038, the
American Security Against Foreign Enemies Act of 2015 (American SAFE Act),
which proposed to alter the screening process for Iraqi and Syrian refugees.146
The text of the bill was brief. At its heart were two certification requirements.
First, before any Iraqi or Syrian refugee could enter the United States, the FBI
Director would need to certify to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Director of National Intelligence that "each [refugee] has received a background
investigation that is sufficient to determine whether the covered alien is a threat
Shabad, supra note 87. The certification requirements provided cover -as one former senior
Defense official said, they gave Defense officials "the ability to be openly in favor of transfer-
ring people but unable to do it, because of the law." Bruck, supra note 5.
143. Note, supra note 37, at 2519 n.117.
144. Paris Attacks: What Happened on the Night, BBC NEws (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.bbc.com
/news/world-europe-34818994 [http://perma.cc/VDL9-PT9j].
145. Attacks in Paris, N.Y. TIMEs, http://www.nytimes.com/news-event/attacks-in-paris [http://
perma.cc/ZNY5-JBF8].
146. H.R. 4038, 114 th Cong. (as introduced in House, Nov. 17, 2015).
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to the security of the United States."147 Second, it required that such refugees
may enter the United States only "after the Secretary of Homeland Security, with
the unanimous concurrence of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion and the Director of National Intelligence, certifies . . . that the covered alien
is not a threat to the security of the United States."148
The bill's chief co-sponsor described the American SAFE Act as a "common
sense" measure that would merely put a "pause" on Iraqi and Syrian refugee ad-
missions until "the law enforcement experts are comfortable that we have got a
process."149 But, as the framework articulated in this Comment makes clear, the
SAFE Act's certification requirements would have been less a pause than a poison
pill.
First, the certifications required the nation's top security officials to make dif-
ficult judgments about future behavior under extremely demanding standards.
Representative Sheila Jackson Lee said it "asks the impossible" of law enforce-
ment officials." 0 FBI Director James Comey agreed, telling lawmakers that be-
cause there are always risks with allowing foreigners into the United States, the
legislation would make it impossible to admit any refugees."' The White House
concurred, proclaiming that " [t] he certification requirement at the core of H.R.
4038 is untenable."152 Judgments that a refugee is "not a threat" are not only hard
to make - if a judgment is wrong, it will be obviously wrong.
It would also be catastrophically wrong, possibly resulting in a terrorist attack.
And the nation's top law enforcement officials would bear a direct, formalized
link to the attack- the refugee would never have been admitted but for their
guarantees. The number of certifications the SAFE Act required exacerbated the
risk, given the challenges of cumulative probability. The FBI Director would
147. Id.
148. Id. § 2(b).
149. 161 CONG. REc. H8383 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2015) (statement of Rep. Hudson).
150. Id. at H839 7 (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee).
151. Evan Perez, First on CNN: FBI Director James Comey Balks at Refugee Legislation, CNN (Nov.
19, 2015, 1:51 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2o15/11/19/politics/fbi-director-james-comey
-refugee-legislation/index.html [http://perma.cc/E7SL-XPQQ].
152. Office ofMgmt. & Budget, Statement ofAdministration Policy: H.R. 4038-American SAFE Act
of 2o15, EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT 1 (Nov. 18, 2015), http://obamawhitehouse.archives
.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/114/saphr438r 2o151118.pdf [http://perma.cc
/C8PU-FPEB]. The author does not know whether the Obama Administration explicitly con-
sidered its experience with the Guantinamo Bay certification requirements when taking this
position, but it seems reasonable to think it might have.
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have to certify approximately 200,000 refugees over the course of a ten-year ten-
ure."' The chance that just one of those individuals might commit an act of ter-
ror is plausibly nontrivial. The sheer number of certifications would not only
make the regime slow and administratively burdensome to implement;154 it also
would dramatically elevate the likelihood of blame.
Finally, the location of the certification makes them even more potent, as the
risks and rewards of certification in the SAFE Act were asymmetric for the certi-
fiers. The FBI Director, for instance, is not responsible for the success of the ref-
ugee program; he is responsible for law enforcement. If 200,000 refugees go on
to live lives of unassuming middle-class prosperity, the public will neither notice
nor thank him for it. But should just one of those refugees commit an act of
terror, the public spotlight would be intense and unforgiving.
In sum, Attorney General Loretta Lynch seemed correct in her assessment of
the bill's impact: "To have my FBI [D]irector or other members of the admin-
istration make personal guarantees would effectively grind the program to a halt.""'
B. Reflecting on the American SAFE Act
Two days after its introduction, the American SAFE Act passed the House. 15 6
While the bill ultimately failed to achieve cloture in the Senate,1 17 it received
nearly fifty Democratic votes in the House - enough to override President
153. This number is calculated by taking the number of Iraqi and Syrian refugees admitted in Fiscal
Year 2016. See Phillip Connor, U.S. Admits Record Number ofMuslim Refugees in 2016, PEw
REs. CTR. (Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2o16/lo/o5/u-s-admits
-record-number-of-muslim-refugees-in-2o16 [http://perma.cc/TZG9-4KCSF], and multi-
plying them by the FBI Director's ten-year term. Act of Oct. 15, 1976 Crime Control Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-503, § 203, 90 Stat. 2407, 2427.
154. The Obama Administration claimed the SAFE Act would "create significant delays and obsta-
cles" for the refugee program. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 152, at 1. The certification
regime would obviously demand time and attention from the senior officials themselves. And
Congressman Brad Sherman wryly noted, "If our security leaders just spend 2 hours on each
[refugee] file, it will consume all of their working hours. ISIS cannot simultaneously and per-
manently incapacitate our security leaders. This bill does." 161 CONG. REc. H8388 (daily ed.
Nov. 19, 2015) (statement of Rep. Sherman). Furthermore, resources would also be consumed
by whatever additional lower-level bureaucratic protocols the principals would surely want
put in place. See, e.g., Savage & Cooper, supra note 87 (describing the legwork Hagel wanted
done before he was willing to sign off on a Guantinamo transfer).
155. Megan Cassella & Patricia Zengerle, Defying Obama, House Passes Bill To Slow Syrian Refugees,
REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2015) (emphasis added), http://ca.news.yahoo.com/u-house-passes
-strict-screening-syrians-defying-veto-1908o5401.html [http://perma.cc/ST5J-6PEB].
156. H.R. 4038, 114 th Cong. (as passed by House without amendment, Nov. 19, 2015).
157. 162 CONG. REc. Sill (daily ed. Jan. 20, 2016).
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Obama's promised veto.' But it seems that at least some Democratic legislators
did not understand the dramatic consequences of the bill they were supporting.
Indeed, after realizing that Democrats were beginning to support the measure,
senior Obama Administration officials "raced""' to Capitol Hill to meet with
Democratic legislators. The officials, however, "were unable to clearly explain
the certification process."16 0 Said Democratic Representative Sean Patrick Malo-
ney, "I started out strongly opposed to it. But then I read the bill and realized
that what it actually required was simple certification."161 He voted for the meas-
ure, saying that "instead of slowing the program or pausing it, the Administra-
tion should agree to immediately certify refugees if they pass the current exten-
sive screenings and we should all refocus on actual threats."162 Other Democrats
seemed to share his view: one said the bill "simply requires bureaucrats to file
more reports and sign more papers" and echoed that the certifications should be
made without changing anything;16 another said the bill "doesn't hurt the ref-
ugee process, so put a certification stamp at the bottom and move on."164 It
seems, then, that unwary legislators shared the view of prior scholars - certifica-
tions are largely pro forma.
But the SAFE Act also shows how, for the savvy legislator, certification re-
quirements can be a powerful tool, both substantively and politically.16 5 Sub-
158. Jennifer Steinhauer & Michael D. Shear, House Approves Tougher Refugee Screening, Defying





162. Press Release, Representative Sean Patrick Maloney, Maloney Statement on American SAFE Act
of 2o15 (Nov. 19, 2015), http://seanmaloney.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/maloney
-statement-on-american-safe-act-of-2o15 [http://perma.cc/SM8L-5EZN].
163. Lloyd Doggett, FACEBOOK (Nov 19, 2015) http://www.facebook.com/lloyddoggett/videos
/vb.154050553704/10153473074978705/ ?type=2&theater [http://perma.cc/P8MD-HAGQ].
164. Sam Stein et al., How the White House Lost Democrats on the Syrian Refugee Bill, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/house-democrats-syria
-refugees-us-564f5607e4bo879a5boac4f7 [http://perma.cc/RXM2-A3IX]. The American
SAFE Act even garnered the votes of Democrats who took an active stand on refugee issues:
ten of the Democrats who voted for the bill had, two months earlier, urged President Obama
to dramatically expand the refugee program to take in 100,ooo Syrians refugees. Id.
165. One reporter called the bill a "brilliant strategic move" for congressional Republicans. Dara




THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
stantively, the bill's architects harnessed the "fear of accountability in an inher-
ently uncertain process" 166 to craft certification requirements that would have
been fatal to the refugee program. But politically, the bill's sponsors were able to
cast the legislation as innocuous: "We're not saying we're refusing. We're just
saying we want a thorough and robust vetting process before they're brought
in," argued Representative McCaul. 167 The bill's advocates could declare their
commitment to refugees even as they closed the door on them. 168 Their tactic
avoided the kind of direct attack on the refugee program that might have united
the Democrats in its defense. 169
At the same time, the American SAFE Act put the bill's opponents in a polit-
ical bind. On the one hand, arguing that the certification requirements would
meaningfully obstruct the refugee program risked undermining confidence in
the program's security screenings. The Obama Administration had made intense
efforts to assure the public that its refugee screenings were exhaustive and
safe.170 To concede that officials would be reluctant to certify the safety of refu-
gees would be tantamount to conceding that the screenings were in fact risky. It
is hard to argue that the public should trust a vetting process for which overseers
do not want to be accountable. On the other hand, the more the White House
touted the rigor of the refugee screenings, the less important it became to oppose
the bill. The better the process, the more the certifications became a nonissue.
166. Russell Berman, Republicans Try To Tangle the Refugee Program with Red Tape, ATLANTIC
(Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/republicans-try-to
-kill-syrian-refugee-program-with-red-tape/416640 [http://perma.cc/L94Y-M24C].
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., 161 CONG. REc. H8382 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2015) (statement of Rep. McCaul) ("The
American SAFE Act also strikes an important balance between security and our humanitarian
responsibilities. It sets up roadblocks to keep terrorists from entering the United States, while
also allowing legitimate refugees who are not a threat to be resettled appropriately."); see also
id. at H8385 (statement of Rep. Poe) (" [This legislation] has nothing to do with refugees as
far as whether we accept refugees. Our country accepts refugees. We always have. That is clear.
It is not the issue of refugees. It is the issue of letting ISIS terrorists get into the country to
kill us. . . ."). Refugee advocates were skeptical. Melanie Nezer, the chairwoman of Refugee
Council USA, said the Republican message "masked the true impact of the legislation," which
would effectively terminate the refugee program: " [T]his is a way to say [that] isn't what
they're doing, but if you look at the legislation, that's actually what the result is." Berman,
supra note 166.
169. Lind, supra note 165.
170. See, e.g., Liz Goodwin, Obama Administration Defends Its Syrian Refugee Screening, YAHOO
(Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.yahoo.com/news/obama-administration-defends-its-syrian
-refugee-212248421.html [http://perma.cc/5SJH-UEQZ]; Steinhauer & Shear, supra note 158
(quoting President Obama saying that the refugee screening process is "the most rigorous
vetting process that we have" for anyone admitted to the country).
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Democratic Representative Jim Himes, who voted for the bill, captured the di-
lemma: Obama officials "have persuaded us that this is a really good process, but
they don't want to certify it. That's an inherently difficult argument to make."7 1
He was right. The real argument, of course, is that the risk of overwhelming
blame means individuals should not be made personally accountable for these
types of decisions at all. But this, too, is a difficult argument to make in American
public life - who could oppose more "accountability" in government? 172
This point touches upon the deeper irony of certification requirements.
While the purpose of certifications is to localize accountability for individual de-
cisions, they can actually mask accountability for decisions as well. The American
SAFE Act would have hamstrung the Iraqi and Syrian refugee programs while
simultaneously hiding who was responsible for the sabotage: the reluctant cer-
tifier, the most proximate obstacle to the programs' success, would become a
lightning rod for criticism. The architects of that reluctance, however, would
be more distant to the action. Powerful certification requirements thereby create
accountability at a smaller scale while obscuring it at a larger one.
CONCLUSION
Existing scholarship has dismissed certification requirements as toothless
checks on the Executive. This Comment argues they can have unexpected bite.
Drawing lessons from Guantinamo and elsewhere, it has aimed to offer a theo-
retical account of how certifications localize accountability and so concentrate the
risk of blame. When targeted at high-stakes decisions, well-crafted certification
requirements become tools of control. In politically fraught situations such as
the transfer of detainees from Guantinamo or the security vetting of refugees
from war-torn countries, the fear of blame will leave certifiers understandably
reluctant to put their name on the line. The Executive's priorities suffer as a re-
sult.
171. Mike DeBonis, House Passes Bill To Tighten Flow of Syrian Refugees Over Obama's Objections,
WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015
/11/19/house-moves-to-tighten-flow-of-syrian-refugees-over-obamas-objections [http://
perma.cc/2BMP-Z5EK].
172. See BEHN, supra note 91, at 2 (describing the public's demand for accountability); MARK H.
MOORE & MARGARET JANE GATES, INSPECTORS-GENERAL: JUNKYARD DOGS OR MAN'S BEST
FRIEND 1 (1986) (noting "an unquenchable thirst for accountability that cuts across the polit-
ical spectrum"); cf Weaver, supra note So, at 381 (describing "hard to vote against" legisla-
tion).
173. The Obama Administration's frustration with Secretaries Hagel and Carter, for instance, is
discussed supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
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If the American SAFE Act is any indication, while some legislators have yet
to fully appreciate the potential power of certifications, others have realized that
they can be a means of weaponizing risk to block executive action. Looking
ahead, it is not hard to imagine shrewd politicians attempting to wield certifica-
tion requirements to shape other issues that involve both difficult risk assess-
ments and extreme blowback for being wrong. Such a possibility requires a reex-
amination of how certifications fit into a transparent and accountable system of
governance.
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